Les mécanismes de gouvernance liés au financement par le capital-risque : une perspective théorique

Abstract

The relationship between the entrepreneur and the investor is often viewed from a conflictual angle based on information asymmetry and on potential stakeholder opportunism. However, venture capital financing includes mixed relationships between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. In this relationship, venture capitalists seek to orient the funded projects towards prospects of success while securing their investment funds through the negotiation of a set of legal agreements. On the other hand, the entrepreneurs strive to have some leeway to manoeuver while maintaining a certain degree of confidentiality. Our research question concerns the various governance mechanisms that surround the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship. Our theoretical framework is based on a double theoretical reading grid, by analyzing this relationship according to the two legal-financial and cognitive approaches of governance. Our results show that venture capitalists not only have a financial impact, but also organizational and cognitive impacts that can govern the internal organization of the venture capital-backed firm. The mode of governance employed can be influenced largely by the individual, organizational, institutional and economic characteristics of the venture capitalists. On the other hand, the managers of venture capital-backed firms may behave in ways that go beyond traditional opportunism, in which they conceal their personal interests, to generate cognitive resources and contribute to value creation.